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This paper presents a general model that covers signaling with and without conflicts of  interest
between  signalers and  receivers.  Krebs and  Dawkins  (1984) argued  that a  conflict of  interests will
lead to an evolutionary arms race between manipulative signalers and  sceptical receivers, resulting
in ever more  costly signals; whereas common  interests will lead to cheap  signals or "conspiratorial
whispers."  Previous simulation models of  the evolution of  communication  have usually assumed
either cooperative or competitive contexts.  Simple game-theoretic and evolutionary simulation
models are presented; they suggest that signaling will evolve only if it is in the interests of  both
parties.  In a model  where  signalers may  inform receivers as to the value of  a binary random  vari-
able, if  signaling  is favored  at all, then  signalers will always use the cheapest and  the second  cheap-
est signal available.  Costly  signaling arms races do not  get started.  A  more  complex  evolutionary
simulation is described, featuring continuously  variable signal strengths and  reception thresholds.
As the congruence of  interests between the parties becomes more  clear-cut, successively cheaper
signals are observed.  The  findings support a modified version of  Krebs and Dawkins’s argument.
Several variations on  the continuous-signaling model  are explored.
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1  THE  PROBLEM  OF  COMMUNICATION
Communication is an important aspect of  the social
behavior of  animals.  Mammals  and birds give alarm
calls  to warn conspecifics of approaching predators;
ants and termites use signals to recruit others to the
defence of  the nest; bees and primates inform others
in their colony or group of  the discovery of  new  food
sources.  Such communication systems typically have
obvious benefits.  Consider the alarm calls of vervet
monkeys, described by  Seyfarth, Cheney, and Marler
(1980).  Vervets call when  they  detect one  of  three (or
sometimes four)  distinct categories of predator, and
the  response of the monkeys who hear the  call  is
appropriate:  the  leopard  alarm,  for  instance,  sends
hearers scrambling into the relative safety of nearby
trees.  Surely the adaptive function of  this communi-
cation system  is to help the monkeys  avoid predation?
At  one  time, when  group  selection as a force in evolu-
tion was held in higher regard than it is today,  this
explanation might have been  uncritically  accepted.
However, the orthodox position in evolutionary biol-
ogy  (Williams,  1966;  Dawkins,  1976;  Maynard
Smith, 1993) now  tells us that animals are best under-
stood  as products of  their  selfish genes: animals do  not
do  things for the good  of  the group  or the species, but
in order to propagate copies of  their genetic material.
From  this viewpoint, avoiding  predation  is likely only
to be  the function of  the response  behavior. The  func-
tion of  the signaling behavior is not so obvious: why
should a monkey that has spotted an approaching
leopard warn  its conspecifics?  Giving  the alarm  signal
may  well increase the risk to the signaler, by  drawing
the leopard’s  attention to itself.
This  problem  applies to many  social signals such  as
alarm and  food  calls.  It is easy to see where the bene-
fit lies for  receivers of  the  signal; being  informed  of  the
approach of  a predator or the location of  food  is clear-
ly useful.  It is not  so easy, however, to determine why
the signaler should  share the relevant information.  In
many  contexts there  will either be no  benefit in doing
so, or, more  likely, costs involved.  These  costs may  be
due to,  for example, energy expenditure in the pro-
duction of  the signal, an increase in personal risk for
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the signaler, or the loss of  food that might have been
consumed  alone.  There  is thus a degree of  altruism in
such signaling.
The problem of accounting for honesty becomes
even more acute when we consider communication
that occurs-or  appears to occur-despite an explicit
conflict of interests between signalers and receivers.
For example, in aggressive or territorial signals, each
animal  would  prefer that the other respond  by  retreat-
ing, and might be expected to exaggerate signals of
strength  or willingness  to  attack.  In many sexual
advertisement signals, it is in the interests of  the aver-
age male  to convince any  female he meets to copulate
with him, but it is in the average female’s interests to
be difficult to persuade, and to mate only with the
highest-quality males.  In  these cases,  the potential
benefits for a dishonest  strategist can be  great.
Even  in  the  apparently  cooperative  context  of
alarm and food calls, what prevents the invasion of
free-riders who  gain the benefit of  others’ honest sig-
nals, but do not pay the costs of  honesty themselves?
How  can honest signaling be an evolutionarily stable
strategy (ESS)?  Furthermore, how  might such com-
munication  have  evolved  in  the  first  place-why,
against an initial background  of  non-communication,
would the first proto-signalers have been selected for
their behavior?
Reciprocal altruism  (Trivers,  1971),  an arrange-
ment  in which one animal bears a cost in order that
another may  gain a (greater) benefit and  later has the
favor returned, provides  a  possible  answer.  Simulation
work such  as  Axelrod  and Hamilton  (1981)  and
Axelrod (1984) has shown  that reciprocal altruism can
generate cooperative behavior  in a  situation where  the
immediate  short-term  interests  of the  participants
conflict.  However, reciprocal altruism requires rela-
tively sophisticated cognitive machinery, in terms of
the ability to identify others and to remember their
record of  cooperation or defection.  It is reasonable to
postulate such cognitive machinery in,  for example,
primates, but  it is not  likely to be common  in the  rest
of  the animal  world.  Reciprocal altruism may  well be
implicated in such primate aberrations as human  lan-
guage, but  the current paper  seeks more  general mech-
anisms.
Kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) may  also be a fac-
tor in explaining the existence of  stable natural com-
munication systems.  Kin selection refers to the idea
that an animal has two ways of  ensuring the survival
of  its  genes:  firstly,  by direct reproduction, and sec-
ondly  by  assisting  relatives  in  their  reproductive
efforts, thereby promoting  the survival of  copies of  at
least some  of  its genes.  In the case of  alarm  calls, even
though a calling animal might suffer a personal cost
due to increased predation risk,  so long as  the call
tends  to  benefit  its  genetic  relatives  to  a sufficient
degree, calling behavior will be evolutionarily stable.
In Sherman’s (1977) investigation of alarm calls  in
Belding’s ground  squirrel, calls were most  often given
by  females who  lived in groups of  related individuals;
kin selection was found  to be the most  likely hypoth-
esis to explain the behavior.
Kin  selection can thus explain apparently  altruistic
communication  among groups  of close  relatives.
However,  communication  systems  in  the  animal
world are  not limited  to  those species  that  live  in
groups  of closely  related  individuals.  What other
mechanisms, apart from reciprocal altruism and kin
selection, might foster the evolution of  communica-
tion despite potential conflicts of  interest between  sig-
nalers  and  receivers?  Under what  circumstances
should we expect would-be communicators to over-
come the perennial problems of  cheating, lying and
bluffing?  A  third  possible evolutionary mechanism
that could lead to honesty  in a signaling system  is the
handicap principle (Zahavi, 1975, 1987).  This is the
idea that honesty  can be maintained  if the signals are
costly  in  a particular way.  However, the handicap
principle has recently received overwhelming  theoret-
ical attention (see for example Grafen,  1990; Iwasa,
Pomiankowski, &  Nee, 1991; Hurd, 1995; Bullock,
1997) and  will only be treated tangentially here.
1.1  Manipulative and  cooperative signaling
Krebs and Dawkins (1984) provide another possible
answer, and in so doing challenge the default notion
that  animal  communication  is  about  information
transmission.  They suggest  that  propaganda  and
advertising make better metaphors for animal com-
munication than does the cooperative use of  language
to share information.  They  view  signaling as a com-
petitive affair involving mind-reading and manipula-
tion.  Mind-reading  consists of  one animal exploiting
tell-tale predictors about  the  future behavior  of  anoth-
er, e.g., a dog  noticing  the bared  teeth of an opponent,
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concluding that it  is  about to attack, and fleeing in
order to avoid injury.  Manipulation  is what happens
when those being mind-read fight back, influencing
the behavior of  the mind-readers to their own  advan-
tage.  For example, a dog  could bare its teeth despite
not having the strength or inclination to attack, and
thus scare off  its mind-reading  opponent. The  authors
predict evolutionary  arms  races between  manipulative,
exploitative signalers and  sceptical receivers, as &dquo;selec-
tion will act simultaneously to increase the power of
manipulators and  to increase resistance to  it&dquo;  (p. 390).
The  result will be increasingly costly signals.  In our
example, the original subtle teeth-baring signal might
become more and more elaborate, and be accompa-
nied by  growling, hair-bristling, staring, etc.
Krebs and Dawkins admit, however, that not all
interactions are competitive  in nature. There  are some
situations in which  it is to the receiver’s advantage to
be manipulated by  the signaler.  For example, a pack-
hunting  predator may  attempt to recruit a conspecific
in order to bring down prey too large for either to
tackle alone. Foraging bees, on returning to the hive,
may indicate  to  their closely related hive-mates the
direction and distance to a source of  nectar. In these
cases the receiver’s compliance  is to the benefit of  both
parties, i.e., there exists the possibility of  cooperation.
Krebs and Dawkins argue that when the two parties
share a common  interest in this way, then a different
kind of signal  coevolution  will  result.  Specifically,
there will be selection for signals that are as energeti-
cally cheap as  possible while  still  being detectable;
Krebs and Dawkins  suggest the phrase &dquo;conspiratorial
whispers&dquo;  to describe these signals.  Rather than sig-
nalers needing to be more and more extravagant in
their  attempts  to  persuade  receivers,  the  opposite
process occurs:  receivers  are  eager to  be persuaded,
and  selection  will  favor  subtle  signaling  and low
response thresholds.  An  implication is that the loud-
er  and  costlier  signaling  displays  of the  animal
world-such as roaring contests in red deer or male
plumage in birds of  paradise-may have been over-
represented in studies of  animal communication  sim-
ply because  they are  obvious  to  human observers.
There may  be a great deal of  conspiratorial, coopera-
tive signaling going on that  is  too subtle for us  to
notice.
Krebs and Dawkins’s argument has been influen-
tial  but no formal justification or model of  it  exists.
One  goal of  the current paper is  to test their predic-
tion that evolved  signals will necessarily be more  cost-
ly when  there is a conflict of  interests than when  the
participants have common  interests.  In order to do
so,  it  will  first  be  necessary  to  determine whether
communication should be expected at  all when sig-
nalers and receivers have a genuine conflict of  inter-
ests.
1.2  Simulation models of  communication
The  current paper uses both game-theoretic and  evo-
lutionary simulation models as tools for investigating
communication in cooperative and competitive con-
texts.  Previous models of  the evolution of  communi-
cation in the simulation of  adaptive behavior (SAB)
and  artificial life (AL) literature have often been con-
structed such that honest signaling is  in the interests
of  both signalers and receivers-any communication
systems that evolve can  therefore be  described  as coop-
erative.  For  example,  Werner  and  Dyer  (1992) postu-
lated  blind,  mobile  males  and  sighted,  immobile
females: The  evolution of  a  signaling  system  was  in the
interests of  both parties as it allowed mating to take
place  at  better-than-chance  frequencies.  In
MacLennan and Burghardt’s (1994) model, signalers
and  receivers  were  rewarded  if  and  only  if  they
engaged in successful communicative  interactions.
Other SAB/AL  models (Ackley  &  Littman, 1994;
Oliphant, 1996) have looked  at the special case where
communication  would  benefit  receivers,  but  the
potential  signalers  are indifferent.  Oliphant argues
that  this is a good  way  to model  the evolution of  alarm
calls:  It  captures the idea that the potential signaler
already knows about the danger of  the approaching
predator, and  tests the stability of  a strategy of  sharing
that information.  In fact, the models  suggest that sig-
naling will not evolve in these cases unless a mecha-
nism  such  as reciprocal altruism or kin selection is in
place.  Note that such mechanisms have no mystical
effect: they  simply  shift the expected long-term inclu-
sive-fitness payoffs for particular strategies such that
communication  is mutually  beneficial.
Finally, some SAB/AL work considers the evolu-
tion of communication in situations where the two
parties. appear to have conflicting interests. Wheeler
and de Bourcier (1995) modeled  aggressive territorial
signaling.  Bullock  (1997)  constructed  a  general
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model  in which  signalers of  varying  degrees of  quality
solicited  receivers for a favorable response;  receivers
were rewarded  for responding  positively only to high-
quality  signalers. A  conclusion drawn  in both  studies
was that if signals were sufficiently costly (e.g., long,
elaborate tails or  energetic ritual displays) then  reliable
communication could evolve and  persist over time-
this  is  in  line  with  Zahavi’s  handicap  principle.
Bullock made the more specific  prediction  that  in
order for communication  to be stable, the net cost of
signaling must be lower for higher-quality signalers
(see also Grafen, 1990).  However, it could be argued
that  such differential  signal  costs  effectively  render
honest signaling mutually beneficial.  We  will return
to this notion below.
A  second goal of  the current paper is  to position
previous SAB/AL  work in an overarching theoretical
context.  To  this end some  general models of  the evo-
lution of  simple signaling systems will be presented;
the models will cover situations with and without a
conflict  of interests  between  the  two  interacting
agents.
1.3  Conflicts of  interest
The  first requirement  in constructing  a general model
of  communication  is a classification scheme  for deter-
mining  when  a conflict of  interests exists between  sig-
nalers and receivers-Figure 1  shows such a scheme,
adapted from Hamilton (1964).  Assume that a suc-
cessful instance of  communication  in a particular sce-
nario has fitness  implications for both participants.
The fitness  effect  on signalers,  Ps,  and the  fitness
effect on receivers, PR3 together define a point on the
plane in Figure 1.  For example, consider a hypothet-
ical food call, by which one animal alerts another to
the presence of  a rich but  limited food  source.  By  call-
ing and  thus  sharing  the  food, the  signaler incurs a fit-
ness cost; by  responding  to the call, the receiver bene-
fits through obtaining food it would otherwise have
missed.  Thus, the call would  be located in the  &dquo;altru-
ism&dquo;  quadrant. The  situations modeled  by  Ackley  and
Littman (1994) and  Oliphant (1996), where  receivers
benefit but  signalers are ambivalent, can  be  thought  of
as  points  on  the  positive  vertical  axis,  i.e.,  where
Ps = 0 and PR > 0-
Conflicts of  interest can be defined as interactions
in which natural selection favors different outcomes
Figure  1.  Possible  communication  scenarios classified by  their
effects on  the fitness of  each  participant.
for each participant (Trivers,  1974), or in which par-
ticipants  place the possible outcomes in  a different
rank  order  (Maynard  Smith  &  Harper,  1995).
Conflicts of  interest therefore exist when  Ps  and  PR  are
of  opposite  sign, i.e., in the upper-left and  lower-right
quadrants.  Selection will, by  definition, favor actions
that have  positive fitness effects.  In the upper-left and
lower-right quadrants, one agent but not the other
will be selected to participate in the communication
system: their interests conflict. The  &dquo;spite&dquo;  quadrant
does not  represent a conflict of  interests because agents
will be mutually  selected not to communicate.
If the specified fitness effects of  participating in a
communicative interaction are truly net values, and
already include such factors as the cost of signaling
and  the cost of  making  a response (as well as inclusive
fitness considerations and  costs due  to exploitation of
the signal by  predators, etc.), then predicting the evo-
lution  of the  communication  system  is  trivial.
Reliable communication requires, on average, honest
signalers  and trusting  receivers,  and thus  will  only
develop when Ps  >  0 and PR >  0,  i.e.,  when both
agents are selected to participate.  However, real ani-
mals sometimes communicate despite apparent con-
flicts  of interest  (Hinde,  1981).  Recent  models
(Grafen, 1990; Bullock, 1997) have established that,
in  certain  situations  where communication would
otherwise be unstable, increasing the production  costs
of  the signal can lead to a prediction of  evolutionarily
stable signaling.  Therefore, in the current model, PS  s
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and PR  refer to gross fitness effects before the specific
costs  of producing the signal,  Cs, and making the
response, CR, have been taken into account.
2 A  SIMPLE  SIGNALING  GAME
If the signaling interaction is to involve information
transmission, and  allow for the possibilities of  decep-
tion and  manipulation, it must  be modeled  as a game
of  imperfect information, in which  the  signaler knows
something that the receiver does not.  Some  theorists
might  find  this  contentious:  after  all,  Krebs  and
Dawkins (1984) have  characterized animal communi-
cation as being more about persuasion than informa-
tion, and Di Paolo (1997) has argued that the term
&dquo;communication&dquo; should not be limited to situations
of  information exchange but defined more  broadly as
coordinated action.  However, alarm and food calls
clearly involve one  animal  with  privileged access to an
item  of information  about  the  world  &dquo;deciding&dquo;
whether or not to share its  knowledge with others.
Di Paolo may  well be right about the boundaries of
communication  being wider than they  are commonly
thought to be, but that does not mean  that an ortho-
dox situation  of possible  information  transmission
fails to qualify.
Figure 2 shows the  extended form of a  simple
action-response game that captures the structure of
the alarm- or food-call context, and arguably other
contexts  besides.  The game begins with a chance
move (the central square) in which some  state is ran-
domly  determined to be either &dquo;high&dquo;  or &dquo;low.&dquo; The
signaler has access to this state, and we can suppose
that it represents either a feature of  the environment
that only the signaler has detected (e.g.,  noticing an
approaching predator), or a hidden internal state of
the signaler (e.g., ovulation).  Based on this state, the
signaler (player I) must  decide whether  or not  to send
an arbitrary signal of  cost Cs.  The  receiver (player II)
is  ignorant  of the  hidden  state  and  only  knows
whether or not a signal was sent-the dashed rectan-
gles show  the receiver’s information sets.  The  receiver
Figure  2.  Extended  form  of  the  simple  signaling  game. Chart
icons index  payoffs in Table 1. 
;&dquo;,
can  respond  either  positively,  i.e.,  perform  some
action appropriate to the high  state, or negatively, i.e.,
not  respond  at all.  Positive responses incur  a cost, CR-
If and only if the hidden state  is  high,  a positive
Table 1.  Payoff  matrix  for the simple game.  Entries in the  table represent the  payoff  to the sender and  receiver  respectively.
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response results in the payoffs PS and PR to the sig-
naler and receiver respectively.  Table  1  specifies the
payoff  matrix.
Hurd  (1995),  Oliphant  (1996),  and  Bullock
(1997) used  similar games  with  different payoff  struc-
tures.  In each of  these earlier games, the receiver was
explicitly rewarded for accuracy in determining the
hidden  state.  In contrast, in the current game  accura-
cy  is not  a goal of  the receiver per  se; the receiver sim-
ply  wants to maximize  its average payoff.  Depending
on the precise payoff  values, the best way  to achieve
that  might  be  to  respond  in  a  blanket  way,  i.e.,
responding negatively or positively whatever the sig-
nal.  This is meant  to reflect the fact that receivers in
natural contexts can presumably opt out of  the com-
munication system if  it is to their advantage to do so;
there is no force compelling them  to pay  attention to
the signaler.
The  game  models a range of  possible communica-
tive interactions.  For example, suppose that the high
state  represents  the  signaler’s  discovery  of food.
Sending a signal might involve making  a characteris-
tic  sound, while not sending a signal  is  to  remain
silent.  For  the  receiver,  a  positive  response  means
approaching  the signaler and  sharing the food, where-
as a negative response means doing nothing. Various
possibilities exist besides honest signaling of  the high
state: The  receiver might  always approach  the signaler
in the hope  of  obtaining food, regardless of  whether a
signal was  sent.  The  signaler might be uninformative
and never signal, or only signal when food was not
present.  One  important feature of  the game  is  that
the signaler is ambivalent  about  the receiver’s response
in the low  state-in terms of  the example, this repre-
sents the assumption that when  no food  has been  dis-
covered,  the  signaling  animal  does  not care  about
whether the receiver approaches or not.
The  strategies favored at any one time  will depend
on the relative values of  Ps, PR, Cs and CR, as well as
on what the other members of the population are
doing.  (Another parameter of  interest is the relative
frequency of  high and low states; in the models pre-
sented here each state  occurred 50% of the time.)
Allowing the base fitness effects Ps and PR to vary
across positive and negative values will allow the pay-
off space of  Figure 1  to be explored, and thus deter-
mine  whether  changes in signal and  response cost can
produce stable signaling in situations that would  oth-
erwise involve conflicts of  interest.  This  will be a  first
step towards assessing Krebs and Dawkins’s conspira-
torial whispers theory.
2.1  Stable strategies in the simple game
A signaling  strategy  in  the  simple  game  specifies
whether to respond with no signal (NS) or a signal
(Sig)  to low and high states respectively.  Likewise, a
response strategy specifies whether to respond nega-
tively (Neg) or positively (Pos) when faced with no
signal and  when  faced  with  a  signal. A  complete  strat-
egy is the conjunction of  a signaling and a response
strategy;  e.g.,  (NS/NS, Pos/Pos)  is  the strategy that
specifies never signaling and always responding posi-
tively.
The  strategy (NS/Sig, Neg/Pos) specifies signaling
only in the high state, and  responding positively only
to signals-call this the  &dquo;honest and  trusting&dquo; strategy.
Evolutionary  stability depends on  a strategy being the
best response to  itself;  i.e.,  a strategy must be unin-
vadable in order to be an ESS.  Honest and trusting
players meeting each other can expect an average pay-
off  per interaction of:
(PS-CS+PR-CR) /4.
This will be higher than the expected payoff  for
any  possible invading strategy (i.e., honesty and trust
will be an ESS) if:
That  is, honest  signaling  is stable if  the costs of  sig-
naling and responding are both positive, and if the
payoffs in each case outweigh the costs.  The  require-
ment  that Ps and  PR  must  both  be  positive means  that
the honest  strategy  is only  expected to be stable when
the interests of the parties do not conflict:  positive
values of  Ps and PR  place the interaction in the upper
right &dquo;mutualism&dquo;  quadrant of  Figure 1.
Of  the 16 possible strategy pairs,  there are three
besides the honest strategy that involve the transmis-
sion of  information, in that the receiver responds dif-
ferently  to different hidden  states.  None  of  these three
strategy pairs are ESSs  if Cs and CR  are both  positive;
these two  values represent energetic costs and so can- 
.
not  sensibly be negative.  If Cs 
= 0, i.e., if  giving a  sig-
nal  is of  negligible cost, then the reverse honesty  strat-
egy (Sig/NS, Pos/Neg) can be stable, although PS and
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PR must  still be positive.  It is also worth noting that
a population consisting  entirely of  individuals playing
(NS/NS, Pos/Pos) or (NS/NS, Pos/Neg), both non-
signaling strategies where  the receiver always responds
positively, cannot be invaded by any other strategy if
the payoff  to the receiver is large enough, i.e.,  if:
The  analysis indicates that  while the cost of  signal-
ing plays some  role in stabilizing the honest strategy,
there are no circumstances in which  stable communi-
cation is predicted when  a conflict of  interests exists.
This  is despite the fact that we  have  separated the  costs
of  signaling and  responding from  the base fitness pay-
offs of  a communicative interaction.
2.2  Evolutionary  simulation model
Game theory is  limited to  describing equilibria;  an
evolutionary simulation model of the simple game
was also constructed in order to determine whether
communicative behavior might sometimes be found
outside the range of  identified ESSs.
A straightforward  genetic  algorithm  (GA)  was
used.  Each individual could play both signaling and
receiving roles; a strategy pair was  specified by  a  four-
bit genotype  as shown  in  Table  2. The  population  size
was 100, the mutation rate was 0.01 per locus, and,
due to the trivially small genome, crossover was not
used.  Each  generation,  500  games  were  played
between  randomly selected  opponents.  An agent
could therefore expect to play  five games  as a signaler
and  five as a receiver.  The  agent’s  fitness score was  the
total payoff  from these games.  For breeding purpos-
es,  the fitness scores were normalized by subtracting
the minimum  score from each.  Proportionate selec-
tion was then applied to the normalized scores.  The
genetic algorithm  was  run  in this manner  for 500  gen-
erations.  In the results presented below, the games
played in the final,  i.e.,  500th, generation have been
used as a snapshot of  the evolved signaling strategies.
An  attempt was made to investigate evolutionary
dynamics,  in  that  the  initial  populations were not
determined  randomly  but  started as either  &dquo;honest&dquo;  or
&dquo;non-signaling.&dquo; 
&dquo;  Honest  initial  populations  were
made up entirely of  individuals who  played the hon-
est and trusting strategy,  i.e.,  a genome of  &dquo;0101.&dquo;
Non-signaling  populations  underwent  100  genera-
tions of  preliminary  evolution in which  their receiving
strategies were  free to evolve but their signaling  strate-
gies were  clamped  at &dquo;00,&dquo;  i.e., no  signaling.  For  each
class of  initial conditions, a simulation run was per-
formed for  all  combinations of integer values of PS  5
and PR between -5 and +5, making 121 runs in all.
Each  run  was  repeated 25 times  with  different random
seeds.  The  values of Cs and CR  were fixed at 1.
Communication was indexed by cross-tabulating
the hidden  state value with  the receiver’s  response  and
calculating a chi-squared statistic. The  receiver has no
direct access to the hidden  state, so any  reliable corre-
spondence between state and response indicates that
information has been transmitted and acted  upon.
Values of  the ~,’ZStatistic close to zero indicate no com-
munication, and  values close to the maximum  (in this
case X2 
=  500, due to the 500 games played in the
final, snapshot generation) indicate near-perfect com-
munication.
Figure 3 shows  the average  values of  the communi-
cation index  for honest  initial conditions.  Seeding  the
population with honesty tests the stability of  honest
Table 2.  Genetic  specification of  strategies.
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Figure 3.  Mean  communication  index by  PS and  PR; honest  initial conditions.  Each  point  is a mean  calculated over 25  runs.
Mean  standard error = 2.96.
signaling given a particular payoff pair,  much as  a
game-theoretic analysis does. The  results are compat-
ible with the conditions outlined in the previous sec-
tion : Honesty  is  stable when the payoffs to signaling
and  receiving are positive and  greater than the respec-
tive costs.  However, there is some  suggestion of  inter-
mittent  or  imperfect  communication  when
PR 
= CR 
= 1, indicating that ambivalent  receivers may
occasionally cooperate.
Figure  4.  Mean  communication  index  by  PS  and  PR; non-sig-
naling  initial conditions. Each  point  is a mean  calculated  over
25 runs. Mean  standard error = 1.67.  Graph  rotated for clar-
ity--cooperative quadrant  appears at top  left.
Figure 4  shows  the average  values of  the communi-
cation  index  for  non-signaling  initial  conditions.
Starting the GA  with a non-signaling population tests
the likelihood that communication  will emerge, given
a particular payoff pair.  Clearly the conditions for
emergence  and  stability-once-present  are  not  the
same.  If Ps  >  1 and PR 
= 2 communication develops
but when  Ps  >  1 and PR  >  2  it does not.
In the latter region PR  >  2 CR  and the population
remains  at the non-signaling equilibrium described in
Section 2.1.  Despite the  fact  that communication
would  result in a higher  average  fitness, the high  value
of  PR  keeps the receivers responding  positively all the
time, removing  any  incentive  for the  signalers to both-
er signaling.  This response strategy could be called
&dquo;blind  optimism,&dquo;  as  receivers always respond posi-
tively.  It should  be  noted, however, that the condition
PR >  2 CR  is dependent  on  the 50%  frequency  of  high
states;  if high states  occurred 10% of the time for
instance, then PR  >  10 CR  would  be required to make
blind optimism  a stable strategy.
The  difference in results between  the two  classes of
initial conditions  is interesting but  should  not  obscure
the fact that no communication was observed under
conditions of  conflicting interests. We  must  conclude
that, at least in the simple model  discussed so far, sta-
ble communication is only to be expected when  it is
  © 1999 International Society of Adaptive Behavior. All rights reserved. Not for commercial use or unauthorized distribution.
 at Periodicals Office on February 29, 2008  http://adb.sagepub.com Downloaded from 357
in the interests of  both  parties.
3 A  GAME  WITH  CONTINUOUS
SIGNAL  COSTS
In the simple signaling game, signalers  can choose
between a costly signal or no  signal at all.  The  model
does not allow  for a range of  possible signals with  dif-
fering  costs, and  in this respect  it is unrealistic.  It may
be that Krebs and Dawkins’s implicit prediction, that
signaling can occur when  a conflict of  interests exists,
is in fact true, but  can  only  be  demonstrated  in a more
complex game  with a range of  signal costs.  The  sim-
ple signaling game  (see Figure 2) was  therefore  extend-
ed to incorporate signals of  differing costs.
3.1  Stable strategies in the
continuous-signal-cost game
In the extended game, the signaling player has three
options: not  signaling, which  costs nothing; using the
&dquo;soft&dquo;  signal, which  costs Cs, and  using  the  &dquo;loud&dquo;  sig-
nal, which  costs 2CS. Strategies in the extended game
require specifying the signal to give when  the hidden
state is low, the signal to give when  it is high, and  the
response to give to each of  no-signal, soft and loud.
The two strategies  representing conspiratorial whis-
pers or cheap signaling  are  (NS/Soft, Neg/Pos/Pos)
and (NS/Soft, Neg/Pos/Neg).  Both  strategies call for
the  soft signal to be  used  in the  high  state, and  for  pos-
itive responses to the soft signal; the strategies differ
only  in the response to loud signals.  Neither of  these
strategies can  strictly be considered an ESS on  its own
(because neutral drift can take the population from
one to the other) but it can be shown that the set of
all  mixed strategies  involving these  two  is  an ESS
under  the familiar conditions:
Costly  signaling would  involve the use of  the loud
signal for the high state, and either the soft signal or
no signal to denote the low state, with a correspon-
ding response strategy.  None  of  the four strategies in
this category  can be an ESS.  For example, (NS/Loud,
Neg/Pos/Pos)  cannot be an ESS assuming positive
costs of  signaling and  responding.  The  similar strate-
gy  (NS/Loud,  Neg/Neg/Pos)  is  almost  stable  if
PS >  2CS, but can drift back to the previous strategy
which can in turn be invaded by the cheap strategy
(NS/Soft, Neg/Pos/Pos).
Analysis of  the extended game  indicates that if  sig-
naling is  favored at all,  then at equilibrium the sig-
nalers will always use the cheapest and the second-
cheapest signal available  (i.e.,  no signal and the soft
signal).  Extending the game by adding ever more
costly signaling  options, until we  have approximated  a
continuous range of  signal costs,  does not alter  this
conclusion. None  of  the  costly  signaling  strategies can
even be an ESS, let alone support communication in
the face of  a conflict of  interests.  The possibility of
expensive signaling arms races starts to look remote.
However, it may be that an evolutionary simulation
model  will reveal signaling  strategies that, while unsta-
ble  in the long term,  nevertheless lead to  transient
communication  under  conditions of  conflicting inter-
est.
3.2  Evolutionary  simulation model
A  second evolutionary simulation was  constructed, in
which  the cost of  signaling was continuously  variable.
Signaling strategies were represented by two positive
real numbers Claw and Chigh :  the cost of the signals
given in the low  state and  in the high  state respective-
ly.  Response strategies were represented by  a real-val-
ued threshold T; positive responses were given to sig-
nals with costs greater than the receiver’s  threshold
value.  Note that threshold value could be negative,
indicating a positive response to any  signal.
A  real-valued GA  was used to simulate the evolu-
tion  of strategies  over  time.  Generally,  the  same
parameters were used as  in  the previous simulation
model, e.g., a population of 100.  Mutation was nec-
essarily a different matter:  each real-valued gene in
each newborn individual was always perturbed by a
random  gaussian  value, f.1  =0,  C=0.05. If  a perturba-
tion resulted in a negative cost value the result was
replaced by  zero.  In addition, 1 % of  the time (i.e.,  a
mutation rate of  0.01) a gene would be randomly  set
to a  value between  0 and  5 for signal costs, or between
-5  and +5  for  the threshold value.  This two-part
mutation regime ensured that offspring were always
slightly different from their parent, and occasionally
very  different.
The  Cs  parameter was no longer relevant, but CR,
the cost of  responding, remained fixed at  1.  Honest
initial  conditions  were  implemented  by  setting
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CuW = 0, Chigh = 1.0 and  T  = 0.5.  Non-signaling  ini-
tial  conditions were implemented by setting T  to a
random gaussian (  f.1  =0,  or =1) and then clamping
C10w 
= Chigh 
= 0 for 100 generations of  preliminary
evolution.
Figures  5 and 6 show the average values of the
communication index for honest and non-signaling
initial conditions respectively.  The  results are qualita-
tively  similar  to  those  of the  discrete  simulation
model: communication  occurs in both  cases, but in a
more  limited range of  the payoff  space for non-signal-
Figure 5.  Mean communication index by PS and PR  in the
continuous simulation; honest  initial conditions.  Each  point
is  a mean calculated over 25 runs.  Mean standard error =
4.22.  Graph  rotated  for  clarity-cooperative  quadrant
appears at top.
Figure 6.  Mean  communication index by PS and PR  in the
continuous  simulation;  non-signaling  initial  conditions.
Each  point  is a  mean  calculated over 25  runs. Mean  standard
error = 3.61. Graph  rotated  for  clarity-cooperative  quadrant
appears at top  left.
ing conditions.  In neither case does communication
occur  outside the &dquo;cooperative&dquo; quadrant.
However,  there  is  some evidence  that  transient
communication can occur when  the conflict of  inter-
ests between the two agents is not too extreme.  For
example, consider the payoff  pair Ps 
= 5 and PR 
= 0.
This defines a point on  the boundary  between mutu-
alism and  selfishness, although  when  the constant  cost
of  responding (CR 
= 1) is taken into account, the net
payoffs indicate that communication under these cir-
cumstances would be selfish (from the point of  view
of the  signaler).  Nevertheless,  as  Figure 7 shows,
unstable communication evolves, even from non-sig-
naling  initial conditions.
The  continuous model  also allows investigation of
the cost and threshold values over the payoff space.
Figure 7.  Mean  communication  index over plotted over gen-
erational time.  A  typical run  with Ps 
= 5, PR 
= 0, and  non-
signaling  initial conditions.
C1ow’ the  cost of  the  signal given in response  to the  low
state, always remained close to zero-this was unsur-
prising as signalers are ambivalent about  the receiver’s
response  to the low  state.  However, the value of  Chigh
varied both  inside and  outside the region where com-
munication  was  established: Figure 8 shows the mean
values of  Chigh for honest initial conditions.  The  sig-
nals given in response to the high state are most  cost-
ly when  PS, the payoff  to the sender, is high and  when
the receiver’s net payoff  is  marginal, i.e.,  PR ==1.  In
order to study  this effect more  closely, additional sim-
ulation runs were performed, with PS fixed at 5 and
PR varied between -5 and +5 in increments of 0.1.
These runs can be thought of  as exploring the cross
section through  Ps 
= 5 in Figure  8.  Figure  9 shows  the
cross-sectional mean values of Ch,gh.  Note that the
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Figure  8.  Mean  cost of  high-state signals by  Ps and  PR;  honest  initial conditions. Each  point  is a mean  calculated  over 25  runs.
Mean  standard  error = 0.032.  Graph  rotated for clarity-cooperative quadrant appears at top.
&dquo;energy&dquo;  devoted  to signaling  is at a maximum  around
PR 
=  1  and drops off  as PR increases-it can be seen
from  Figure 5 that PR 
= 1  is approximately the point
where significant communication  is established.  The
same pattern was observed for non-signaling initial
conditions (not shown  for reasons of  space).
The threshold values show corresponding varia-
tion.  Figure 10 shows the mean  value ofT  across the
payoff  space.  The threshold values are typically very
high  (a  &dquo;never  respond&dquo;  strategy)  or very low (an
&dquo;always  respond&dquo;  strategy),  but in the region where
Figure 9.  Cross-sectional means  (t  standard  error) for high-
state signal costs with PS 
= 5; honest  initial conditions.  Each
point  is a mean  calculated over 25 runs.
communication evolved,  receivers  become progres-
sively less demanding,  i.e., T  gets lower  as PR  increas-
es.  Figure  11  shows the  cross-sectional  results  for
Ps = 5.
Figure 10.  Mean  threshold  value by  Ps and  pR; honest  initial
conditions.  Each point is  a mean calculated over 25 runs.
Mean  standard  error = 0.19. Graph  rotated  for clarity-coop-
erative quadrant  appears at top  left.
Figure 12 plots the mean  cost of  high and low signals
and the mean reception threshold all on one graph.
This makes  the relationship between  costs and  thresh-
old clear: At  approximately PR 
= 1, the threshold falls
to a level where  the mean  high-state signal will gener-
ate a positive response. As  PR  increases, i.e., as the two
players’  payoffs  approach  each  other,  the  signalers
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Figure 11.  Cross-sectional mean threshold values (t  1 stan-
dard  error) with PS 
= 5; honest  initial conditions.  Each  point
is a mean  calculated over 25 runs.
become  less extravagant and the receivers less &dquo;scepti-
cal.&dquo;  This is  contra the game-theoretic result of  the
previous section, which implies that when  signals of
varying costs are available, either the cheapest pair of
signals will be  used, or no  signaling  will occur-some-
thing like Figure 13 would be expected if the soft-
loud signaling game  accurately modeled  the continu-
ous case.
Figure 12.  Cross-sectional means: cost of  high and low  sig-
nals, and reception threshold.  Ps 
= 5, honest initial condi-
tions.  Each  point  is a mean  calculated over 25 runs.
Note that the initial values of  Chigh and T  under
honest initial conditions were 1.0 and  0.5 respective-
ly.  For all  but the highest values of PR,  Chigh  has
increased on average  over  the  500-generation  run.
This  rules out any  explanation of  the  results of  Figure
12 in terms of  there having been insufficient evolu-
tionary time for a cheaper signaling equilibrium to
have  been  reached  when  the  profit  for  receivers
(PR - CR)  was  marginal.  Evolution  has taken the pop-
ulations away  from the cheap signaling solution.
Figure  13.  Approximate predicted  results  for  Figure  12
according  to discrete-cost game-theoretic model.
3.3  Discussion
In all of  the models  presented so far, stable communi-
cation evolved or was predicted to evolve only  within
the cooperative region of  the signaler-receiver payoff
space.  This means that no signaling at all  (costly or
otherwise) was observed when the signaler and the
receiver were  experiencing  a conflict of  interests, apart
from transitory communication on  the boundaries of
the cooperative region as shown  in Figure 7.
The second game-theoretic model, in which dis-
crete  signals  of varying costs  are  available,  suggests
that communication, if selected for, will involve the
cheapest pair of  signals available.  However, the sec-
ond  simulation model, incorporating the more  realis-
tic assumption that signals can vary continuously in
cost, implies that cheap  signals will only  be used  when
both  parties stand  to gain a high payoff  from  effective
communication. When  the net payoff  to the receiver
is marginal, evolved signals will be more costly than
strictly  necessary  to  convey the  information.  The
relationship is not symmetrical: When  the net payoff
to the signaler is marginal, a non-signaling equilibri-
um, in which the receiver always responds positively,
is likely to occur.
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Krebs and Dawkins (1984) predicted that signal-
ing would be costly if a conflict of  interests existed;
strictly speaking the results do not support nor con-
tradict their prediction,  as no signaling occurred in
the conflict-of-interest cases.  It might  be the  case that
conflicts of  interest in the context of  a different sig-
naling game would indeed result  in  costly  signals.
However, the failure to evolve communication given
conflicts of  interest in this simple game  strongly sug-
gests that in many  natural contexts (e.g.,  food calls,
alarm calls) reliable signaling should not be expected
unless it is in the interests of  both parties.  This con-
clusion is not  altered by  separate consideration of  the
specific costs of  producing  a signal and of  making  an
appropriate response to that signal.
The  results from the second simulation model do
not  confirm Krebs and  Dawkins’s  conspiratorial whis-
pers theory, but they  definitely suggest a modification
of  it.  As  Figure 12 shows, when  the net payoff  to the
receiver  is  marginal,  receivers  will  be sceptical and
express &dquo;sales-resistance&dquo; by  responding  only  to costly
signals;  signalers  in turn will  be prepared to  invest
more  energy  in &dquo;convincing&dquo; receivers to respond  pos-
itively.  When communication  is  unambiguously
good  for both  parties, signals are cheaper  and  response
thresholds lower.  Therefore both expensive hype and
conspiratorial whispers are expected to evolve, but in
a much  smaller region of  the payoff  space than Krebs
and Dawkins’s theory suggests, i.e., within the coop-
erative region.  Expensive hype  is what  happens when
honest  signaling  is highly  profitable to the signaler but
only marginally so to the receiver.  For example, sup-
pose  that  a juvenile  benefits  by honestly signaling
extreme  hunger  to  its  parent,  because  the  parent
responds by feeding it.  If the net inclusive-fitness
payoff  to the parent  is only  slight, perhaps because  the
parent is  the ostensible father and the species has a
high  ratio of  extra-pair copulations, then  costly  signals
by  the  juvenile are expected. Thus  the model  predicts
that chicks should beg more loudly to  their fathers
than to their mothers, for instance.
4 VARIATIONS ON  THE
CONTINUOUS-SIGNAL-COST  GAME
Caryl (1987) has expressed dismay at a tendency in
the theoretical-biology literature for those who  build
mathematical or simulation models to engineer them
solely in order to support  a favored hypothesis, and  to
fail to consider the broader implications and predic-
tions of  such models.  Caryl’s point is  that it  is very
easy  to  judiciously  choose  parameter  values in order  to
get a desired result but harder to construct a model
that makes  sensible predictions in a range of  contexts.
A  number  of  variations of  the evolutionary  simulation
model with continuous signal and threshold values
will therefore be  presented.  It is hoped  that the results
from these variants will  increase the reader’s  confi-
dence in the validity and general applicability of  the
model.
In order to avoid any  further profusion of  graphs,
the  variants will incorporate only  non-signaling  initial
conditions.  Rather than requiring the reader to con-
stantly compare  each figure with Figure 6-the  mean
communication  index  data for the continuous-signal-
cost game  with non-signaling initial conditions-the
communication index results in each variant will be
presented  as  differences  from  that  graph.  That  is,
Figure 6  will be used  as a reference level of  communi-
cation ;  positive  results  for  a variant will  indicate  a
greater relative  level of communication and not an
absolute measure.
4.1  Noise and  uncertainty 
&dquo;&dquo;
The use of  continuous values for the cost of  signals
and  for the response threshold suggests the possibility
of  random  noise in the signaling channel.  In the real
world signals will not always be accurately perceived,
and Johnstone (1994) found that modeling noise or
perceptual error in a  signaling game  in fact altered the
predictions about  which  strategies were  expected  to be
stable.  It was thought that perhaps the inclusion of
noise would alter the region of the payoff space in
which communication  evolved.
Noise  was  implemented  by  adding  a  random
gaussian value (p 
= 0) to the energy  level of  the signal
before it was perceived by  the receiver.  Thus, signals
will sometimes be heard as  &dquo;louder&dquo;  or &dquo;softer&dquo;  than
they  in fact are. When  the random  gaussian value had
a standard deviation of  0.2, noise made  very  little dif-
ference to the communication index data, i.e.,  com-
munication evolved much  as in Figure 6.  When  the
standard deviation was  set to 2.0, on  the other hand,
communication was entirely disrupted.  Presumably
intermediate levels of  noise would have led to a pro-
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gressive  degradation of communication, but as  yet
only  two  noise  settings  have  been  investigated.
However, there was no evidence that the addition of
noise could lead to honest signaling in regions of  the
payoff space  where  it  would  otherwise  not  have
occurred.
Randomness  was also applied to the payoff  values
Ps and PR  in order to investigate the effects of  realis-
tic uncertainty.  The  payoff  values, as in all game-the-
oretic accounts, are intended to be average expected
payoffs.  However, computer simulation allows us to
assign  payoffs  in  a  particular  interaction  that  are
drawn from a random gaussian distribution.  Thus
the long term mean  will be as specified, e.g., Ps 
= 2
and PR 
= 2, but the rewards for successful communi-
cation  in  any one game will  be somewhat unpre-
dictable. When  the standard deviation of  the random
gaussian was  0.2, the evolution of  stable communica-
tion was unaffected.  When the standard deviation
was  increased  to  2.0,  communication  started  to
degrade as shown in Figure 14.  However, there was
again no suggestion that the modeling  of  uncertainty
in payoff  values could lead to communication where
it would  not have otherwise evolved.
4.2  Exploitation of  sensory  biases
and  mutational  lag
The  simple games and  simulations described here are
in  one  sense  an  unfair  way  to  test  Krebs  and
Figure 14.  Difference  in mean  communication  index  between
uncertain payoff  variant ( p 
= 2.0) and  standard continuous-
signal-cost game;  non-signaling  initial conditions. Each  point
is the difference between two means, each calculated over 25
runs.  Graph  rotated  for  clarity-cooperative  quadrant
appears at top right.
Dawkins’s  (1984) conspiratorial whispers hypothesis.
Krebs and  Dawkins  discuss the likely evolution of  sig-
nals  in complex real-world cases  and can therefore
appeal to the exploitation of response patterns that
had originally been selected for other purposes, the
effects  of differing  mutation  rates  in  signalers  and
receivers,  etc.  Communication in  their  predicted
costly signaling arms  races was not  necessarily expect-
ed  to be stable.  For  example, in a real-world situation
where  it  was  not  in  the  interests  of receivers  to
respond positively to a particular signal from  a preda-
tor,  they might nevertheless continue to do so  for
some time if the signal was structurally similar to a
mating signal made by members  of  the same  species.
The  manipulative  signaling  system  would  break down
as  soon  as  an  appropriate  sequence  of mutations
resulted in organisms that could distinguish between
the predator’s signal and the conspecific mating sig-
nal.  In the signaling models presented all  this com-
plexity is  abstracted into the base fitness payoffs for
signalers and  receivers.
In an attempt to investigate these issues, two sim-
ple modifications were made  to the standard  continu-
ous-signal-cost game. In the  first of  these, we  suppose
that the receivers have some other ecological reason
for having a low threshold value, e.g.,  that the same
sensory mechanisms are involved in food detection.
This opens up an opportunity  for signalers to exploit
a  &dquo;sensory bias&dquo;  (Guilford  &  Dawkins, 1991; Ryan  &
Rand, 1993) in the receivers.  Selection pressure for
low  thresholds  (T)  was  implemented  by  giving
receivers in each game  an  energy  bonus  (B) as follows:
The  results of  simulation runs of  this variant are
shown in  Figure  15  (using Figure 6 as  a baseline).
When  receivers have other reasons for maintaining a
low  response  threshold, communication  evolves much
more reliably in the usual cooperative region of  the
payoff space,  and also  occurs in  the selfish  region.
That is,  signalers are able to manipulate receivers to
their own (the signalers’) advantage. Furthermore, as
predicted by Krebs and Dawkins (1984), the most
costly signals indeed occurred when communication
had  been established despite a conflict of  interests.
In another variant,  it is supposed that response
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Figure 15.  Difference in mean  communication  index between sensory  bias variant and  standard continuous-signal-cost game;
non-signaling  initial conditions.  Each  point  is the difference between  two  means, each  calculated over 25 runs.  Graph  rotated
for clarity~ooperative  quadrant  appears at top  left.
strategies  might evolve  more slowly than signaling
strategies,  i.e.,  there is a mutational lag on reception
thresholds relative to signal cost values.  Such a state
of  affairs could come about in the real world if the
sensory equipment used to detect signals was older
and affected by a larger network of genes than the
organs used for signaling.  It would then be possible
that signalers might &dquo;out-evolve&dquo;  receivers, and suc-
ceed in getting them  to respond to selfish, manipula-
Figure 16.  Difference  in mean  communication  index  between
mutational lag variant and standard continuous-signal-cost
game; non-signaling  initial conditions.  Each  point  is the dif-
ference  between two means, each calculated over 25 runs.
Graph rotated for clarity-cooperative quadrant appears at
top left.
tive signals.  The  idea was implemented by reducing
both of  the mutation  rates for reception thresholds by
a  factor of ten. That  is, the real-valued threshold gene
in a newborn individual was perturbed by  a random
gaussian  value, p=  0, 6=  0.005, and  0.1 % of  the time
(i.e.,  a  mutation  rate  of 0.001)  a  completely new
threshold value was generated in the range t5.  The
results are shown  in Figure 16.
As  with  the sensory  bias variant, communication  is
established more strongly in part of  the cooperative
region, but  it also evolves in the selfish region  for high
values of  PS.  Again, the most costly signals were also
found when selfish communication had evolved.  A
puzzling  feature of  the result is that it does not  appear
to have come about simply because the low rate of
mutation  for threshold values meant  that 500  genera-
tions was  insufficient time  for the optimal  value to be
reached.  Mean threshold values when PS 
=  5  and
PR <  0 were approximately four in both the muta-
tional lag variant and  the original simulation data.
4.3 The  effects of  spatial arrangement
Ackley and Littman  (1994)  and Oliphant  (1996)
both found that arranging signaling populations in
space led to a  greater degree of  altruistic signaling.  In
Ackley  and  Littman’s model  individuals lived in small
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groups, communicating  and  breeding only  with their
group-mates, but occasionally migrating to another
nearby group.  There was no spatial  arrangement
within each group, but the groups themselves were
laid out on a grid.  In Oliphant’s model individuals
were arranged in a ring, and  were  likely to communi-
cate and to breed with their neighbors.
A  spatial  variant was implemented by arranging
the  population  of  100  individuals  on  a  toroidal
10 x 10 grid.  Individuals interacted only with their
eight neighbors: in each game, a signaler was chosen
at random from the population and a receiver was
chosen at random from among the signaler’s neigh-
bors.  Breeding  was also local.  When  one generation
replaced another,  the parent of the individual who
would occupy a particular square was chosen, using
roulette-wheel  selection  according  to  fitness,  from
among the nine local candidates from the previous
generation.  That  is,  the parent of  the occupant of  a
given square  would  either be  tt.~ previous occupant  or
one  of  the previous occupant’s  neighbors. The  results
for the spatial variant are shown  in Figure 17.
Arranging the  population  in  space  leads  to  an
increase in the reliability of  communication, but only
in that section of  the cooperative region where hon-
esty has already been observed to evolve. The agents
have clearly not been induced to participate in altru-
istic communication with their neighbors.  There is
no communication even when signalers  are merely
ambivalent (Ps 
= 0).  However, it can be shown  that
Figure 18.  Difference in mean  fitness between  spatial variant
and  standard  continuous-signal-cost game;  non-signaling  ini-
tial  conditions.  Each point is  the difference between two
means, each calculated over 25  runs.  Graph  rotated for clari-
ty-cooperative quadrant appears at top  left.
altruism of  a sort has occurred.  Figure 18 shows the
difference in mean  fitness between the spatial variant
and the  original  simulation.  There  is  a  spike  of
increased fitness in the altruistic quadrant  at the front
of  the graph: This occurs because receivers are refrain-
ing from constant positive responses, and thus being
altruistic towards the signaling neighbors who  would
Figure 17.  Difference in mean  communication  index between spatial variant and  standard continuous-signal-cost game; non-
signaling  initial conditions.  Each  point  is the difference between two means, each calculated over 25 runs.  Graph  rotated for
clarity-cooperative quadrant appears at top  left.
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be  penalized by  a  positive response  because  of  the neg-
ative value of  PS in this area.
4.4  Insistent signalers
The  signaling game used is not likely to be a univer-
sal model of  all possible communicative interactions.
In particular, and  despite having  the same  basic struc-
ture with two  signals possibly used to transmit infor-
mation about a binary hidden state,  the  signaling
game  is  different  from  those  employed  by Hurd
(1995),  Oliphant  (1996),  and  Bullock  (1997).
Hurd’s game, for  instance,  models sexual signaling,
and the male signaler  is  not ambivalent about the
female receiver’s  response when the hidden state  is
low; the signaler always prefers a positive response. A
low  hidden state maps to low male  quality, a positive
response  represents  a  copulative  episode,  and even
low-quality males want mating opportunities.  The
current signaling game, in contrast, cannot model  so-
called  &dquo;handicap&dquo;  signaling,  because  low-state  sig-
nalers  do  not  care  about what the  receiver  does.
Furthermore,  in previous games, receivers are explicit-
ly rewarded for  accuracy in  discerning the hidden
.  state, but the game  presented here allows the ecologi-
cally plausible outcome that receivers simply become
disinterested in the signal.  The  current game  is a rea-
sonable model of  situations such as alarm calls and
food  calls, in which  potential signalers have no  reason
to care about  what  receivers do  when  no  predator has
been  sighted  or  no  food  source  has  been  found.
Whereas Hurd’s game  serves as a (discrete) model of
situations where signalers vary on some dimension,
the current game models situations where signalers
fall into two groups, only one of  which  is  relevant to
the potential response.
However, it is a simple matter to alter the present
game  such that signalers are always interested in gain-
ing a positive response.  The payoff  matrix is  altered
such that PS,  the payoff to the signaler,  is  awarded
whenever the receiver responds positively, regardless
of  the value of  the hidden state.  However, receivers
are  still  only awarded their  payoff,  PR, when they
respond  positively and  the hidden  state is high. There
is thus a different kind  of  conflict of  interests between
the signaler and  receiver.
Making  signalers want  positive replies all the time
in this way  almost completely breaks down commu-
nication (graph not shown).  There are no circum-
stances  in  which receivers  can  trust  signalers,  and
extreme response strategies  (always responding posi-
tively or  always responding  negatively) are formulated
purely on the  basis  of the  payoff to  the  receiver.
Interestingly, communication can be salvaged if the
Figure 19.  Difference in communication  index between  handicap  principle variant and  standard continuous-signal-cost game;
non-signaling  initial conditions.  Each  point  is the difference between  two  means, each calculated over  25  runs.  Graph  rotated
for clarity-cooperative quadrant  appears at top left.
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conditions of  the handicap principle are applied: that
is, if the unit cost of  giving a signal in the low  state is
greater than for the high state.  The  results for a run
in which signals in the low state cost 5 times their
normal value are shown in Figure 19; relative to the
standard game, communication  levels are only some-
what  degraded.
5  GENERAL  DISCUSSION
The  results from simulations of  the simple and con-
tinuous-cost signaling games suggest that communi-
cation  will not  evolve when  there is a  conflict of  inter-
ests between signalers and receivers.  Even when  sig-
nalers and  receivers share a common  interest, the evo-
lution  of communication  is  not  straightforward.
Firstly,  receivers  may fall  into  blindly  optimistic
strategies (i.e.,  always responding positively) that are
less efficient than the communicative  equilibrium but
nevertheless stable.  This  is particularly likely to occur
when the net payoff to  the receiver  is  high.  (The
expected payoff  for always responding positively will
of course depend on the relative frequency of high
and  low  hidden  states, a factor that was not varied in
the  models  presented).  Secondly,  communication
may  evolve but the signals involved will be more or
less  costly depending on the marginal payoff of the
receiver, as discussed in Section 3.3.
Variations on  the continuous-cost signaling game,
while only  briefly explored, suggest that communica-
tion can  in fact evolve under  conditions of  conflicting
interest if  receivers have a sensory bias that maintains
low response thresholds, or if response strategies do
not evolve as quickly as signaling strategies.  In these
two  cases, manipulative or  selfish communication  can
occur.  Of  course, in the case of  a sensory bias,  the
communication that evolves  is  not really occurring
under a  conflict  of interests,  because  receivers  are
choosing  the  strategy  that  maximizes  their  two
sources of  fitness: the communication game and the
independent response  bias.  However, an observer
unaware of  the receivers’ response bias would  observe
agents responding to signals in a way  that was not in
their immediate  interests.
Altruistic  communication  (considered  from the
point  of view of  signalers) was  not  observed under  any
circumstances,  including the spatial  variant simula-
tion.  Spatial arrangement of the population would
seem not to be a guarantee of  kin-selected altruism.
The occurrence  of apparently  altruistic  food  and
alarm calls in nature, in circumstances where  recipro-
cal  altruism and kin  selection  cannot be invoked,
therefore remains to be explained.
The  evolutionary  simulation models  presented are
unusual  in their use of  non-random  initial conditions.
The  use of  non-signaling initial conditions in partic-
ular can be seen as an attempt to get at the origin or
emergence of  communication rather than just study-
ing the conditions for its  stability,  as does orthodox
game  theory.  Non-signaling  initial  conditions
embody the assumption that communication must
emerge from  a non-communicative context-the un-
clamping of  signaling strategies after a period of  pre-
liminary evolution can be seen as the introduction of
a mutation  that allows the  possibility of  signaling. The
simulation  results  have certainly demonstrated that
the conditions for stability can be very  different from
those for emergence.
A  final qualification must  be made  concerning  the
results: The  way  that conflicting and  congruent  inter-
ests have been defined may  be too simplistic.  In the
simple signaling game,  it is true that with  positive net
payoffs to the  signaler and  the receiver, and  if the hid-
den  state is high, both agents will benefit from  a pos-
itive  response,  and they  therefore  have  congruent
interests.  However,  if we consider the moment  before
the hidden state has been determined, it is not clear
whether  the interests of  the two  agents  conflict or  not.
If the signaler,  for example, could somehow choose
the strategy of its  opponent, the receiver,  it  would
want the opponent to play an &dquo;always  respond posi-
tively&dquo;  strategy-that way the signaler would always
receive the payoff  and  would  not  have  to expend  ener-
gy in signaling.  However, the receiver,  if similarly
allowed to  determine the  signaler’s  strategy,  would
prefer that the signaler used an honest strategy, pre-
cisely so  that the receiver could avoid the costs of
responding  positively to the low  hidden state.  Recall
that  Trivers (1974) defined a  conflict of  interests as an
interaction in which natural selection favors a differ-
ent outcome for each participant.  It  seems that the
signaler and receiver in this situation favor different
strategies in their opponent, and  thus have a conflict
of  interests, even though a high value of  the hidden
state would mean  that their interests became  congru-
ent.  If this strategy-based definition of conflicting
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interests were adopted, any  situation in the coopera-
tive payoff  region, assuming signaling had a positive
cost, would  involve a  conflict of  interests-this would
in turn mean  that all of  the signaling observed in the
simulation models evolved despite a conflict of  inter-
ests.  The  problem  is perhaps  that Trivers’s (1974) and
Maynard Smith and Harper’s (1995) definitions are
not specific enough about just what constitutes an
&dquo;outcome&dquo; of  the signaling game. The  simpler  defini-
tion of  conflicting  interests, as used  in the body  of  the
.  paper, is useful in isolating the cooperative region of
payoff  space as the place to expect signaling.  It is not
yet clear how  the results should be interpreted if the
strategy-based definition of conflicting interests was
pursued.
NOTES
1 As Di  Paolo (1997) has  pointed  out, both  Ackley  and
Littman (1994) and Oliphant (1996) do not for-
mally demonstrate that kin selection has affected
the course of  evolution in their models. They  sim-
ply assume that kin selection can be equated with
spatial  arrangement,  in  which an agent  interacts
with neighbors who  are likely to be relatives.
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